

C-II CHRON

EXCOMM

Oct 23 Ship Kimouk carefully picked as "right one."

[Consider: blockade path if Sows hadn't
turned back.]

Pres asked ^{ISI} analysis of effects of blockade — not food & medicine — on Cuba, and comparable analysis of effects of comparable blockade of Berlin.

Contingency Plan for shutdown of U-2. Pres informed
through SAC/ODD channels; ^{expected that} if clear indication result of
hostile action, ^{will be} recommendation for immediate retaliation on most
likely SAM involved. Defense to have capacity to hit
site (8 planes) within 2 hours of event (SecDef to inform
Pres max 15-min from event. [Anderson?])

In Pres absence, SecDef authorized to act only if ^{hostile} U-2
shutdown is very clear. Expected, but not definitely decided,
that if hostile actions continue after retaliation, action against
SAM system would become necessary.

Disc. of possible reaction in Berlin.

Pres indicated he would wish to consider whether additional low inspection of convoys would be acceptable.

(after meeting)
(Nitzze designated: Ch. for Berlin Contingencies)

(Nitzze missed this meeting?)

#2, 6M Oct 23

Nitzze invited to sit with ExCom as subcom. chairman

Subcommittees? a) Thompson: Ambassador's Group ?

b) Postwar Forward Planning Group

c) Kitchen - Ben. Policy Operation Planning Group?

d) Nitzze: Berlin

e) Common: Vienna, Oriskany

#3 10AM Oct 24

In middle of meeting, reports that certain low ships had appeared to have stopped or turned back; Pres directed no more interaction of any target for at least another hour while checking with sources.

(earlier) SecDef noted presence of subs near more interesting ships; idea of dealing with subs; might have to destroy.

.... Some ships turning back; give them every opportunity to turn back.

| Strong affirmation by Secretary to keep abjection in mind;
| Turn Back Ships, not capture.

[?] [Had blockade "achieved its purpose" by late 24 Oct? Hence, caution in intercepting?]

#5 5PM Oct 25

Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded turned back and therefore no ship had so far been boarded.

Pres: any incident should be avoided till we heard prob. afternoon Oct 26 — whether it had accepted or rejected UJL. 2d proposal. Decision as to stopping tanker Kragney, if it continues, made then.

3 paths

#4, 10 AM Oct 25

Pres directed, instructions issued for selective investigation and boarding of non-bloc ships, evaluating tankers.

[Zimmelt: Ritz: a) Non-bloc; b) satellite; c) Sov.

Armed forces in Cuba instructed to fire only in response to attack.

Pres: Buchanan, Tanaka, not to be interested for present.

OOD paper to intercept of approx. bloc ship Friday night.

Pres approved version of reply to USSR, but revised version approved by Pres at 1:15 pm

Pres asked for alternative courses of action for immediate future.

Martin assigned at 9:15 pm to do study on establishment of American Military Base in Cuba.

Dillon paper: Scenarios for Airstrike Against offensive missile bases and launchers in Cuba.

#5
(Regulated #4, 10 AM; discussed 5 PM,

#5: discussed: military path, political path (who?) and an interrupted second L.T.

~~#5~~ #6, 10 AM Oct 26

McG called attention to civil defense problem; obtained agreement that no crash program would be ~~initiated~~ undertaken now,

Decision on negat recon deferred.

G. R discussed political measures, including 24-48 hr. Stevenson/ U Thant negotiations, an atom-free zone in C.A. and the proposed approach to Castro.

Ans. Stew. discussed immediate negot. with U Thant, as well as the longer talks which would follow if agreement could be reached.

[Was approach made to Castro?]

[9]

Draft on Nuclear-free zones (25 Oct? revised 26)

Turkey must be included in ME nuclear-free zone.

Should have to withdraw weapons from Turkey
to achieve settlement of Cuban situation.

H37: 10 AM Oct 27

McN recommended, Pres approved, 2 daylight recon today:

1 morning and 1 this afternoon [underwater?] Again

recommended night recon tonight. In response to Rusk's

request for delay of the mission, Pres said recon planes should
go on alert, ... final decision this afternoon.

Agreed Russians would be informed of extent of
quarantine zone privately. It could then decide whether to
turn back Sov tanker Bragoroff, which will ^{be} entering quarantine
zone later today. If Prog. continued, a decision could then be
made as to whether it would be allowed to proceed to

^{should be}
Hansen or whether it stopped, searched, & released,
if as reported, it had on board no political material.
A decision could also be argued as to what action should
be taken if the tanker refused to submit to search.

4. At this point in the meeting the partial text of the
Sov public statement was received. It became clear
that the tone of the public statement varied considerably
from the proposals made by K in his personal letter to
the Pres last night. Pres approved release of public statement,
which was drafted during the meeting. A second and
longer statement was to be prepared. (This was later
abandoned).

Draft message to K was dismissed and a final version
will be completed for Trans. this afternoon.

Decision to drop leaflets deferred.

#8, typed

#10, 11AM Oct 28

1. Full TASS text read
2. McNamara: Grayson was standing still and no other Blue ships would be entering quarantine zone today.
3. Pres directed no air recon be flown today, no action be taken against Blue ships today, but every effort made to get CV to fly recon missions Monday.
Classified info authorized released to CV on ^{offensive} low amounts to facilitate inspection tasks.

Pres approved public statement welcoming Sov decision to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. He agreed that we should need offensive weapons to include bombers, but should not get bogged up on this issue.

[Minutes essentially for action purposes?]

Pres directed letter to K be drafted.

13

Oct 30

McN reported he had ordered that no U-2 planes fly until a satisfactory system was developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflying Soviet territory.

14 10 AM Oct 31

McC: photos of Oct 29 inconclusive.

R: Castro adamant w/o inspection. Pres conf. postponed.

Pres: recon be flown tomorrow unless progress made in talks.

15 Oct 31, 8 PM

R: unsatisfactory talks between UT and Castro.

tomorrow:

Pres: a) No U-2 flights

b) Up to 14 low-level sorties, but no plane would make more than one pass over each area. Pres said we were anxious to stop aerial surveillance as soon as UX provides a satisfactory substitute. He added this should be a matter

of priority with us because, if a US plane is shot down, we may have to take retaliatory measures.

Oct 24, 3:25

6 most interesting ships have turned back

Oct 24, 8:05 pm

10:30 pm Bell reads K letter to Pres (put yourself in my place.)

Pres: I by are obviously not going to stop. He is stopping the ones he doesn't want us to have. I suppose we will have to stop there.

10:45 Pres. It seems to me that this record will be published. my two letters to him and his two to me.

This is a sympathetic appeal. Imagine what you would do if you were in my position. Who have we got around who can write a letter?

Bell: Churchill + myself. We can do that.

Pres: It wouldn't have to be too long. "As I stated in my speech, reassurances that these weapons are not being sent. That is the reason we are taking this stand, and it is a source of regret to me."

disc. of Bucharest

11:15 Pres. (got CJ to negotiate SU to hold shipping.)

11:35 pm: Body: Pres thinks this one (K letter) is the height of hypocrisy. (written at W. H.)

(Thompson: last para. ^{ends} signifies local construction).

12:20 Star: get US out of bed. dictated to him.

12:30 Body: message to K: its your fault and not ours on the

basic ground that they misled us — the thing we think we ought to get back into his chest. The wound of the law how is what caused the trouble.

Bundy makes reply to Ball.

Ball: There is only one very minor point, but I think it might be a major one. That is we use the offensive weapons; actually, my understanding in the conversation with Douglas, that there was explicit that they had no weapons that could reach the U.S.

Bundy: He didn't say it that way.

Ball: I got this from the Secretary.

Bu: He didn't say it. At least, it did not appear in any transcript we had.

Ball: This may have been given by DeLongis.

Bundy: It is true that DeLo has said things. I think the language is more precise than we can document to the Chinese.

Ball: Well, of course, his answer will be that they are not offensive.

Bundy: Well, he never said that actually.

Ball: The only thing that concerns me about the Stinson thing is that he has probably given the impression to C J that we will go further than we will go. That's what worries me.

Bundy: -